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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Appellant, Mrs. Menz, appealed from the lower Court's "Order Amending 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce" (hereinafter, "Order 
Amending") on the sole issue of whether the lower Court erred in awarding the 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Mr. Menz, the sum of $76,781 in the Fidelity Investment 
Account as his separate property rather dividing it equally as marital property. 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Mr. Menz, appealed all orders signed by Judge Dever. 
Mrs. Menz submitted her "Brief of Appellant"(herinafter, "Appellant's Brief). 
Appellee submitted his "Brief of Cross-Appellant" (hereinafter, "Appellee's Brief) 
in which he responded to Appellant's brief and asserted his arguments in support of 
his Cross-Appeal. Mrs. Menz shall respond to the arguments of Mr. Menz in support 
of his Cross-Appeal in Part I herein and shall reply to Mr. Menz' response to Mrs. 
Menz' brief in Part II herein. 
ARGUMENT 
PART I: RESPONSE TO MR. MENZ ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF HIS 
CROSS-APPEAL. 
Virtually all of Mr. Menz in support of his Cross-Appeal hinges on his 
assertion that Judge Thorne had signed Mr. Menz' proposed findings and conclusions 
and his proposed decree of divorce (hereinafter "Thome's Findings and Decree") 
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prior to Judge Dever signing findings and conclusions and a decree of divorce. As 
a result, Mr. Menz asserts (1) that the "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
the Decree of Divorce, signed January 16, 2001 (hereinafter collectively "Dever's 
Findings and Decree) (R. 1184 and R. 1248) and Judge Dever's subsequent Order 
Amending (R. 1297) constituted two amendments to the Thorne Findings and Decree 
and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit two amendments; (2) that Judge 
Dever, in his Order Amending, did not have the authority to change the allocation of 
property that Judge Thorne had made in his ruling (See transcript of ruling at R. 
1348); alternatively Mr. Menz clains that it was an abuse of discretion for Judge 
Dever to do so; and (3) that Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require 
the judge to grant or deny a new trial and do not permit just "amendment"; (4) that 
Judge Dever was required to make findings explaining and supporting his changes 
to the Dever Findings and Decree and failed to do so; and (5) that Judge Dever erred 
in awarding each party his/her inherited sums as their separate property. 
As set forth below, Mrs. Menz will demonstrate that each of Mr. Menz' 
arguments are without merit, that Mr. Menz has made misleading statements to this 
Court and has deliberately distorted the facts and the law. As a result, this Court 
should deny Mr. Menz' Appeal and award Mrs. Menz attorney fees and costs for this 
appeal. 
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POINT I 
THERE IS ONLY ONE SET OF FINDINGS 
AND DECREE, THOSE SIGNED BY JUDGE 
DEVER, AND MRS. MENZ DID NOT AMEND 
THE FINDINGS AND DECREE TWICE 
Mr. Menz keeps beating a dead horse. The question of whether there were two 
sets of findings and decrees was resolved months ago as a result of the Joint Motion 
of the parties. The sequence of events and the pertinent documents are set forth in the 
parties' Joint Motion for Correction or Modification of Record and for Leave to 
Amend on file with this Court (hereinafter "Joint Motion"). A copy of the Joint 
Motion is attached hereto as Addendum No. 1. 
The following is a brief summarization of the essence of the Joint Motion: 
Judge Thorne, who had tried the case in February, 2000 resigned shortly thereafter 
and Judge Dever was assigned to the case; the parties and Judge Dever all were under 
the assumption that Mr. Menz' proposed findings and decree to which Mrs. Menz had 
filed an objection were still pending when Judge Thorne resigned; Judge Dever 
proceeded to rule on Mrs. Menz' objections and ultimately signed the Dever Findings 
and Decree on January 16, 2001 (See Addendum No. 3 to Appellant's Brief); the 
parties subsequently discovered that on June 30,2000, Judge Thorne had signed the 
original proposed findings and conclusions which Mr. Menz had prepared and 
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submitted and to which Mrs. Menz had filed objections. Thus, it appeared there 
were two sets of Findings and Conclusions and two Decrees of Divorce signed by the 
two different Judges, Judge Dever and Judge Thorne. (See Add. No. 1 hereto). As 
a result, the parties filed the Joint Motion on December 20, 2001 asking this Court 
to temporarily remand the case to the district court so that Judge Dever could 
conference with Judge Thorne and sort out the discrepancy; this Court temporarily 
remanded the matter to Judge Dever. (R. 1344). A copy of the Order (for temporary 
remand) is attached hereto as Addendum No. 2. On June 5,2002, Judge Dever made 
a minute entry resolving the discrepancy. (R. 1352). A copy of the Minute Entry is 
attached hereto as Addendum No. 3. 
According to Judge Dever's minute entry (Add. No. 3), he consulted with 
Judge Thorne regarding the discrepancy between the two findings and decrees. He 
concluded and ruled that Judge Thorne had signed the original proposed findings and 
conclusions under the assumption that there were no objections by Mrs. Menz when 
in fact there was an objection on file by Mrs. Menz. He also concluded that the 
parties and Judge Dever were unaware that there were any signed findings and decree 
at the time Mr. Menz submitted to Judge Dever revised findings and decree in 
December of 2000, which had been prepared by counsel for Mr. Menz and approved 
by counsel for Mrs. Menz. Judge Dever ruled that the decree he signed on January 
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16,2001."... is the Decree of Divorce in this case. The Findings of Fact and Decree 
entered in error on June 30,2002, [referring to those signed by Judge Thorne] are set 
aside." 
Despite the clear and unambiguous ruling of Judge Dever (R. 1352, Add. No. 
3 herein), Mr. Menz, still persists in claiming that there are two sets of findings and 
decrees and that as a result, Mrs. Menz' "Objections to Respondent's Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" (R. 1110) and her Motion to Amend 
constitute two "motions to amend" which is not permitted under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
In order to reach this analysis and conclusion, Mr. Menz has distorted the facts 
and the law in his Appellee's Brief to this Court. He repeatedly uses terms such as 
"both requests to modify", "amended twice", "Second Memorandum of Petitioner", 
"second proceeding commenced by Gail Menz to amend the findings and decree", 
"two objections",".. .allowing a hearing and awarding relief on the second motion. 
..", and "another motion to modify". 
Mr. Menz can characterize the proceedings however he pleases, but it does not 
change the fact that there are not now, and never were, two valid findings and 
decrees-there is only one set of findings and decree which is the Dever Findings and 
Decree. 
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POINT II 
PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 63(a), JUDGE DEVER HAD 
AUTHORITY TO ENTER FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
DECREE OF DIVORCE EVEN THOUGH 
JUDGE THORNE HAD TRIED THE CASE 
Mr. Menz has argued that Judge Dever did not have the authority to change 
Judge Thome's decision/mling. Beside the fact that Mr. Menz cites no legal 
authority to support his position, Mr. Menz has already tacitly agreed that Judge 
Menz had authority to not only enter findings and a decree, but that he had authority 
to change Judge Thome's award and recalculate the property/money distribution. 
To illustrate Mr. Menz' acknowledgment of Judge Dever's authority, Mr. Menz 
has never disputed or complained about the fact that Judge Dever credited $18,000 
to Mrs. Menz' side of the ledger as the value of her automobile even though Judge 
Thome had not included that amount in his calculations. (See page 9, para. 9 of 
Appellee's Brief). The result benefitted Mr. Menz by increasing the lien granted to 
Mr. Menz on the marital abode by the sum of $ 18,000. Mr. Menz refers to that error 
of Judge Thome as a "defect in the calculations" of Judge Thome. IcL This re-
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calculation of the division of marital property was done pursuant to an exparte 
communication, i.e., a letter Mr. Menz' attorney had sent to the Court along with his 
proposed findings and decree. Judge Dever explained this re-calculation in his 
minute entry of November 2, 2000 (R. 1160), a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Addendum No. 4. 
Mr. Menz, however, now disputes Judge Dever's authority to re-calculate and 
correct calculations of Judge Thorne that benefit Mrs. Menz. 
Aside from Mr. Menz' implicit recognition of Judge Dever's authority as a 
successor Judge, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63(a) provides for a successor judge 
to step in when the Judge who tried the case is unable to finish the case due to a 
disability. Rule 63(a) provides: 
Rule 63. Disability or disqualification of a judge. 
(a) Substitute judge; prior testimony. If the judge to 
whom an action has been assigned is unable to perform 
the duties required of the court under these rules, then 
any other judge assigned pursuant to Judicial Council 
rule is authorized to perform those duties. The judge to 
whom the case is assigned may in the exercise of discretion 
rehear the evidence or some part of it. 
Under Utah law, the resignation of a Judge is a "disability" within the meaning 
of Rule 63(a). Butler v. Wilkinson. 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987): State v. Kelsev. 532 
P.2d 1001 (Utah 1975). Judge Thorne resigned from the Third District Court to take 
8 
a position with the Utah Court of Appeals. Thus, he was disabled within the meaning 
of Rule 63(a). 
When a case is tried without a jury, as was the Menz case, and the disabled 
judge who tried the case has rendered a decision and expressed/stated his findings and 
conclusions, Rule 63(a) permits a successor judge (Judge Dever in this case) who did 
not try the case to enter formal Findings and Conclusions and Judgment which are 
consistent with such decision and findings and do not diverge from the decision and 
findings on material matters. See Butler, supra: see Kelsey. supra. It is worth noting 
that Rule 63(a) has been revised since Butler and Kelsey. At the time those cases 
were heard, the rule included a requirement that for a successor judge to have 
authority in a matter tried before the disabled judge, a verdict must have been 
rendered or findings filed. The statute has been revised and its current version 
became effective November 1,1999 (prior to the Menz trial). The current version is 
less restrictive than the prior one because on its face; it essentially gives the 
successor judge unfettered discretion to perform an act regarding a case, regardless 
of the stage of the proceeding. Therefore, the Butler and Kelsey cases may not 
accurately state the powers of a successor judge under the current version of Rule 
63(a). The powers may be even broader under the current version. 
Nevertheless, Judge Dever's actions pass muster even under the Butler and 
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Kelsey cases. Judge Dever did not try the case, rather, Judge Thorne did. Judge 
Thorne put his decision and findings on the record in open court. (R. 1348; see Add. 
No. 1 to Appellant's Brief). Judge Thome's decision was essentially that the marital 
property should be divided equally between the parties, neither party should be 
awarded alimony, the credit card debt is a community debt and should be equally paid 
by the parties, and the parties inheritances are marital, not separate, property. The 
Dever Findings and Decree (R. 1184 and 1194; see Addenda No.s 3 and 7 to 
Appellant's Brief) are entirely consistent with Judge Thome's ruling in every respect. 
Judge Dever divided the value of the marital property equally, he denied alimony to 
either party, he split the credit card debt and awarded the parties' inheritances as 
marital, not separate property. The only difference in the property award from Judge 
Thome's award was that Judge Dever, at Mr. Menz request, added the $ 18,000 auto 
of Mrs. Menz to Mrs. Menz' side of the ledger and thereby increased the lien 
awarded to Mr. Menz on the marital abode by the sum of $18,000. 
Mr. Menz agrees that Judge Dever's award of property was the same as Judge 
Thome's, except to correct a "defect in the calculations" of Judge Thome (See 
Appellee's Brief, pg. 9, para. 9). Yet Mr. Menz then asserts that Judge Dever 
"drastically changefd]" the proposed findings "originally approved by Judge Thome" 
which "frankly appear to be necessary and supportive to a degree of the decisions 
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made by Judge Thorne . . . " (See Appellee's Brief, p. 35). 
Judge Dever did strike some of the language in the proposed findings and 
decree that Mr. Menz had submitted (R. 1160, 1184, and 1197). A copy of the 
proposed Findings and Conclusions which Judge Dever interlineated are attached to 
Addendum No. 4 hereto. It is evident from a brief review of Addendum No. 4 that 
the changes Judge Dever made were not "material" or substantive and merely brought 
the Findings and Decree in line with the actual findings made by Judge Thorne in his 
ruling on the record. For example, on page 3, No. s 5 and 6 of Mr. Menz proposed 
findings were stricken by Judge Dever. These proposed findings dealt with the 
grounds for divorce. Mrs. Menz had alleged adultery and abandonment on the part 
of Mr. Menz. (See Verified Complaint, R. 1-14). Mr. Menz had included a proposed 
finding that there was no evidence that Mr. Menz had been unfaithful to Mrs. Menz 
prior to the commencement of the action. A review of the trial transcripts and of 
Judge Thome's ruling (R. 1348 and Add. No. 1 to Appellant's Brief) clearly 
demonstrates that Judge Thorne never made such a statement. In fact the trial 
transcript reveals that Mrs. Menz did in fact present evidence that Mr. Menz was seen 
leaving the home of another woman in the early morning hours. (See Trial Transcript, 
R. 1349 beginning at p. 129). In his ruling, Judge Thorne stated "[c]ertainly, each 
side can point fingers and say they're at fault for this or they're at fault for that." (R. 
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1348 at p. 46; see Add. No. 1 to Appellant's Brief). Thus, for Judge Dever to allow 
such a finding would not have been consistent with Judge Thome's findings and the 
evidence; it would have been contrary. Furthermore, it was not material to a finding 
of irreconcilable differences as grounds for divorce. 
As another example, on pages 11,12, and 13 of Mr. Menz proposed findings, 
(Addendum 4 hereto), Judge Dever struck paragraphs 41 through 53 which dealt 
soley with the parties' earning potentials and Mr. Menz' reasons for not working. 
These paragraphs (while not entirely accurate as proposed by Mr. Menz) would only 
be material if alimony were to be awarded. However, Judge Thome expressly stated 
"I'm not going to award alimony. I'm going to find that with assets of $665,000 each, 
they have the ability to support themselves." (R. 1348 at p. 48; see Addendum No. 1 
to Appellant's Brief). Thus, for Judge Dever to include three pages of findings 
regarding employment history and earning potential would have been inconsistent 
with Judge Thome's ruling and immaterial. 
Despite Mr. Menz' attempts to convince this Court otherwise, the original 
proposed findings submitted to Judge Thome by Mr. Menz were not Judge Thome's 
words-Judge Thome's findings were clearly set out in his oral ruling from the bench. 
The proposed findings which Judge Dever struck were the machinations of Mr. 
Menz' and his counsel's minds. Mr. Menz' argument that Judge Dever made 
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substantial changes to necessary findings by Judge Thome is just another distortion 
of the facts and the record in an attempt to sway this Court. 
POINT HI 
PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 59(a), JUDGE DEVER HAD 
THE AUTHORITY TO AMEND HIS PRIOR 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS EVEN 
THOUGH HE DID NOT TRY THE CASE 
Mr. Menz has asserted (again without legal citation), that Judge Dever did not 
have the authority (or abused his discretion) to correct the calculations of Judge 
Thome's property awards or to correct Judge Thome's ruling regarding the parties' 
inheritances. 
Many courts in many jurisdictions across the United States have been 
confronted with a similar question, i.e.. the extent of the authority of a successor 
judge under Rule 59(a) to amend or make new findings in a case which was heard by 
a different judge (not a jury). The general consensus appears to be that under Rule 
59(a), the second judge (successor judge) is not barred from re-examining the first 
judge's decision, vacating it, amending it or granting a new trial. See 58 Am. Jur. 
13 
2d. New Trial. §202: see 20 ALR Fed. 13 (1974). While the prior judgment is not res 
judicata, courts generally give some deference and respect to the prior judge's ruling. 
It is a matter of comity and respect .IcL Mr. Menz' statement in his brief, that the 
successor judge should afford great weight to the prior judge's ruling, is simply not 
the applicable legal standard. Not surprisingly, Mr. Menz did not cite any legal 
authority for that statement. 
In Anderson v. Dewey. 82 Idaho 173 (Idaho 1960). 350 P.2d 734 (Idaho 1960) 
, the Idaho Court was confronted with a situation similar to the case at bar. The 
Idaho Court ruled that where a case is tried without a jury and a motion under Rule 
59(a) is heard by a successor to the trial judge, the successor judge may make new 
findings and conclusions and direct the entry of a new judgment if he is not required 
in doing so to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon credibility of witnesses, and 
he may exercise the same authority as could the judge who tried the case. IcL 
Judge clearly accorded deference to Judge Thome's decision to split the marital 
property equally, deny alimony, and split the marital credit card debt. There were no 
facts in dispute that needed resolution and the credibility of a witness was not in issue 
at the hearing on Mrs. Menz Motion to Amend. (See hearing transcript at R. 1351; see 
Add. No. 2 to Appellant's Brief which is the portion of the transcript where Judge 
Dever gave his ruling on the Motion). 
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The Court in Anderson, supra, also stated that a successor judge " . . . has the 
same authority as his predecessor and authority to set aside his predecessor's findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, judgment and decree and enter new ones adverse to the 
old." Id At 179. 
Three of the four changes made by Judge Dever were simply calculation errors 
on the part of Judge Thome, just like the $18,000 auto Judge Thorne had forgotten 
to put on Mrs. Menz' side of the ledger. As previously acknowledged by Mr. Menz, 
Judge Dever did have the power to correct a calculation error without abusing his 
discretion or violating any legal principle. 
The fourth issue was one of law-whether the inheritances of the parties were 
separate or marital property. As stated above, a successor judge is not bound by the 
prior judges interpretation of the law, and it would be appropriate for the successor 
judge to rule differently to prevent an injustice. See 58 Am. Jur. 2d §202. supra: 20 
ALRFed. 13. supra.. 
Mr. Menz' argument that Judge Dever was limited to either granting or 
denying a new trial to Mrs. Menz is simply incorrect. The very wording of the Rule 
makes it abundantly clear that the court has numerous options; it can "open the 
judgment, if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact 
and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry 
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the parties. (See Motion and Memorandum at R. 1205 and R. 1260). An affadavit 
was submitted in regard to surprise. (R. ). Mr. Menz asserts that there was no 
"surprise". Whether or not "surprise" existed is immaterial because Judge Dever 
made his ruling on the inheritances under subsection (6) "error of law". (R. 1351). 
POINT IV 
UNDER UTAH LAW, MONEY INHERITED 
BY A SPOUSE IS SEPARATE PROPERTY AND 
IF IT HAS BEEN COMMINGLED WITH JOINT 
MARITAL PROPERTY, IT SHOULD BE AWARDED 
TO THE SPOUSE WHO INHERITED IT IF IT CAN 
BE TRACED AND IDENTIFIED 
Mr. Menz cited Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988) as the law 
in Utah on the awarding of the parties' inheritances. Mrs. Menz agrees that 
Mortensen is the law on that matter. It supports the proposition that the two 
inheritances should have been awarded as separate property. Judge Dever adhered 
to the principle of law that even if the inherited funds have been commingled with 
joint marital funds, they are to be awarded as separate property if they can be traced. 
Both Mr. and Mrs. Menz agree that they put their inheritances into an account 
that also contained joint monies. They both agree that over the years, the parties 
withdrew funds from the Joint Fidelity Account for various family expenses, family 
trips, family automobiles, gifts and autos for their children; thus, funds withdrawn for 
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such family purposes was joint money for joint expenses. Judge Dever reasoned that 
since the account held significantly more than the amount of the inheritances that had 
been deposited into that account, the unused portion contained each party's inherited 
sums, that is, it could be and was separate property because it could be traced into that 
account. (See Judge Thome's ruling at R. 1351 and Addendum No. 2 to Appellant's 
Brief). 
Mr. Menz complains that since the amount each inheritance earned cannot be 
determined and thus awarded to the proper party, that none of the inheritance, even 
the readily identifiable portion of the inheritance, the principal, should be awarded 
as separate. This makes no sense and is contrary to the entire concept and policy 
reasons for awarding an inheritance to the spouse who inherited it. It really appears 
that Mr. Menz is not necessarily against the concept but just thinks he should have 
been awarded the earnings on the principal sum. This is not possible without some 
complex tracing, which Mr. Menz did not do and Mr. Menz did not attempt to trace 
the amount earned on his inheritance. It would be contrary to Utah law to refuse to 
award the identifiable and traceable principal just because the earnings have not or 
cannot be traced. That would be throwing the baby out with the bath. 
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POINT V 
MRS. MENZ IS ENTITLED TO AN 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
BECAUSE MR. MENZ' APPEAL IS 
FRIVOLOUS AND HIS ARGUMENTS 
DO NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS 
OF RULE 24(j) FOR ACCURACY 
This Court has stated that " . . . when an appeal is frivolous.. .we will award 
fees regardless of the trial court's ruling on fees."Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah 
App. 1990). Rule 24(j)ofthe Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require briefs to 
be presented with "accuracy" and to be "free from burdensom, irrelevant, immaterial 
or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or 
stricken,... and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer.'Td. 
At the time of submitting his Appellee's Brief, Mr. Menz was well aware that 
Judge Thorne only signed the proposed findings because he assumed there were no 
objections from Mrs. Menz. (See Addendum No. 3 hereto). He is also aware that 
those findings are not part of the record and have been set aside. WL Yet Mr. Menz 
has repeatedly distorted and misstated the facts and the record by his continued 
insistence that there are two findings and decrees, that Mrs. Menz brought two 
motions to amend, and so on, despite the clear ruling from Judge Dever on the Joint 
Motion which both parties had made to resolve the question. This is not only 
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frivolous and innacurate, it borders on "scandalous". Further, Mr. Menz had the 
ability to solve the issue raised by Mrs. Menz appeal but repeatedly refused to do so, 
i.e.. Mr. Menz could have and should have provided documentation regarding the 
funds in his individual Joint Fidelity Account. As a result, thousands of dollars have 
been spent on attorneys fees and costs and hundreds of hours of this Court's and the 
lower court's time have been wasted. (See discussion in Part II below). Mr. Menz' 
Appellee's Brief shoud be stricken and attorney fees awarded to Mrs. Menz. 
PART II: REPLY TO MR. MENZ' RESPONSE TO MRS. MENZ' 
BRIEF (APPELLANT'S BRIEF) 
Mrs. Menz has asked this Court to award her half of the sum of $76,781 which 
is the sum in Mr. Menz separate investment account (the Fidelity Investment 
Account) which has not been "traced" as separate property. 
Mr. Menz argues that sum reflects earnings on his separate property of 
$202,211 over the course of 13 months. Mr. Menz stated at trial that the sum 
reflected such earnings and that he did not make deposits into that account after the 
$201,211 was transferred into it. However, even if that were true, Mr. Menz did not 
testify or present any documentation at trial as to how much was in that account prior 
to the placement of his separate $201,211 into it. In his Appellant's Brief, pp. 12-13, 
para. 32, he states that he "then took that money [referring to the $201,211] and 
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deposited it into a new account with Fidelity in his name alone." This is a false 
statement. A review of the trial transcript cited by Mr. Menz, "Trial T. Vol 2, p. 201, 
11. 11-13" shows that Mr. Menz did not testify that it was a "new" account. While it 
is possible (although highly improbable) that the $76,781 reflects earnings, and while 
it may be true that Mr. Menz did not make any deposits into that account after 
depositing the $201,211 into it, it certainly raises the question as to why Mr. Menz 
refused repeatedly to provide such documentation to Mrs. Menz and why Mr. Menz 
refused to offer any documentation at trial. That would have resolved the issue right 
then-perhaps that is exactly what Mr. Menz was afraid of. Even at the hearing on 
Mrs. Menz' Motion to Amend in April of 2001, knowing that Mrs. Menz was seeking 
a division of that excess $76, 781, Mr. Menz again did not produce any 
documentation even though the Court had the power and authority to open up that 
issue and take evidence on it. Mr. Menz' refusal to provide "tracing" documentation 
has wasted numerous hours of this Court's time and the lower Court's time, and has 
taken numerous hours of Mrs. Menz' time and cost her thousands of dollars in 
attorney fees and costs. 
All of the cases that discuss the fact that separate property once commingled 
with joint property must be traceable, contemplate just that-tracing by virtue of 
documentation, not just self-serving statements. 
21 
Mr. Menz admittedly withdrew at least $20,000 in the 13 months the money 
was in the account prior to trial. So if the $201,211 had been the only money in that 
account, it would have earned and almost impossible return of 48% per annum. The 
bottom line is that Mr. Menz failed to meet his burden and demonstrate to the Court 
that the $76,781 was his separate property. 
This Court should overrule Judge Dever on this issue and direct him to divide 
the sum and make the necessary calculations and orders. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, this Court should (1) deny Mr. Menz' appeal; 
(2)grant Mrs. Menz appeal and award her half of the $76,781; and (3) award Mrs. 
Menz attorney fees for bringing her appeal and for defending against Mr. Menz' 
appeal 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thi 
Syzanne West, Atprney for Appellant 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2#h day of January, 2003,1 caused two copies of the 
forgoing document, REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, to be deposited in the United 
States postal service, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Gregory B. Wall 
Wall & Wall 
Suite 200 
4460 S. Highland Dr. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GAIL PATRICIA MENZ, ; 
Petitioner / Appellant/Cross-
Appellee ] 
vs. ] 
WILLIAM JEFFREY MENZ, ] 
Respondent/ Appellee/Cross- ] 
Appellee. ] 
) Appellate Court No. 20010567-CA 
ADDENDA 
1. Joint Motion for Correction or Modification of Record 
and for leave to Amend 
2. Order of the Utah Court of Appeals temporarily remanding 
case 
3. Minute Entry, dated June 5, 2002, by Judge Dever regarding 
the remand 
4. Minute Entry by Judge Dever, dated November 2, 2000 with 
attached interlineated proposed "Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
Law" and interlineated proposed "Decree of Divorce". 
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ADDENDUM NO. / 
Suzanne West (3430) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
908 Baker Avenue 
Salmon, Idaho 83467 
Telephone: (208) 756-4401 
Facsimile No.: (208) 756-8328 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GAIL PATRICIA MENZ, 
Petitioner and Cross-respondent, 
vs. 
WILLIAM JEFFREY MENZ, 
Respondent and Cross-Petitioner. 
JOINT MOTION FOR CORRECTION 
OR MODIFICATION OF RECORD 
AND FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
Appellate Court No. 20010567-CA 
INTRODUCTION 
COME NOW Petitioner, Gail Patricia Menz, by and through her counsel, Suzanne 
West, and Respondent, William Jeffrey Menz, by and through his counsel, Gregory B. Wall, 
and jointly move this Court for an Order: 
(1) directing Judge William Thorne and Judge Leon A. Dever to attempt to explain, 
clarify, correct or modify certain aspects of the record on appeal as more fully explained 
below; and 
(2) for leave for either party to amend her/his appeal and docketing statement 
following this Court's Order. This joint Motion is made pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the I>.ui 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and a mediation conference which was conducted on October 
30,2001. 
GROUNDS FOR MOTION 
The grounds for this Motion are that it appears there is a difference as to what the 
record discloses and what occurred in the trial court. Resolution of this discrepancy would 
greatly simplify the issues on appeal. The parties have, therefore, agreed to bring this motion 
jointly. 
The discrepancy in the record, as more fully explained in the chronology of Stipulated 
Facts, infra, is as follows: On January 16, 2001, Judge Dever (who replaced Judge Thorne in 
the lower court in this matter in the summer of 2000) signed one set of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce (hereinafter, "Dever Documents"); subsequently, 
another set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce was 
discovered which appear to be signed by Judge Thorne and bear the date of June 30, 2000, 
(hereinafter "Thorne Documents"); the existence of the Thorne Documents was not know n to 
either party (and apparently not to Judge Dever) at the time Judge Dever signed the Dever 
Documents; on June 6, 2001, pursuant to Petitioner's Motion to Amend under U.R.C.P. 59, 
Judge Dever signed an Order Amending Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce (hereinafter, "Amended Findings and Decree"). Petitioner has appealed a portion of 
the Amended Findings and Decree" and Respondent has cross-appealed all orders signed by 
Judge Dever, including the Dever Documents and the Amended Findings and Decree. It is 
Petitioner's position that the Thorne Documents do not affect the validity of the Amended 
Findings and Decree; it is Respondent's position that the Thorne Documents invalidate both 
the Dever Documents and the Amended Findings and Decree. 
The parties have agreed that within five days of filing this motion either party may P'e 
a memorandum, not to exceed three pages, explaining that party's position on this matter. 
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RELIEF REQUESTED 
The parties request that this Court enter an Order directing Judge Thome and Judge 
Dever, within sixty (60) days of this Court's Order, to prepare a written response to the 
following four questions: 
(1) did Judge Thorne actually bign the "Thorne Documents" (see paragraph 16 below); 
(2) if so, did Judge Thorne do so intentionally, with knowledge that Petitioner had 
filed objections to Respondent's Propobed Findings and Decree (see paragraph 7 below); 
(3) if the answers to (l)and (2) are yes, then why was the existence of the Thorne 
Documents unknown to the parties and Judge Dever; and 
(4) what should be done to resolve the discrepancy and clarify the status of the case on 
appeal? 
The Parties further request thai both be given leave to amend their appeal/cross-appeal 
and docketing statements once this disviepancy in the record has been resolved. 
STIPULATED FACTS 
1. Until approximately July o\ 2000, Judge Thorne was the Judge assigned to this 
matter in the lower court; he heard the iial in February, 2000 and heard closing arguments on 
April 28, 2000 at which time, Judge lb >rne ruled orally from the bench. 
2. A transcript of closing arguments and Judge Thome's ruling of April 28, 2000 was 
ordered by counsel for the parties to ,iMSt in preparing findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and the decree of divorce 
3. The transcript was receive y counsel about the end of May or early June, 2000. 
4. Counsel for Respondent p. red proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
3 
Law and Decree of Divorce (hereinal : Proposed Findings and Decree"). Attached to the 
Proposed Findings and Decree was a . c. ificate by counsel for Respondent stating that he rad 
mailed the proposed Decree of Divorce 10 counsel for Petitioner on June 6, 2000, and that if 
the Decree of Divorce had not been ; ioved by June 13, 2000, it would be submitted to the 
court for signature. Counsel for Petit.*- cr had moved to Salmon, Idaho prior to that date. 
Although the certificate states that the proposed Decree had been mailed to counsel for 
Petitioner at the correct Idaho addres> ounsel for Petitioner had not received the Proposed 
Findings and Decree by June 13, 200 ) 
5. On June 14, 2000, counsel for Respondent submitted the Proposed Findings and 
Decree to Judge Thome for signature, along with a cover letter stating that no reponse had 
been received from counsel for Petit ;:cr and requesting Judge Thorne to sign the Proposed 
Findings and Decree as submitted. A c< py of the cover letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 
No. 1. Also on June 14, 2000, coun^ I for Respondent faxed to counsel for Petitioner a copy 
of the cover letter, Exhibit No. 1. 
6. Upon receiving the fax, c^'..-el for Petitioner telephoned counsel for Respondent 
and informed him that she had never received the Proposed Findings and Decree and arranged 
with counsel for Respondent to pro\ .i he documents and give Petitioner until June 21, 
2000 to object. Counsel for Petitioi lephoned Judge Thome's clerk and advised her of the 
extension to June 21, 2000 for filing objections. 
7. On June 21, 2000, counsc ; , Petitioner filed "Petitioner's Objections to 
Respondent's Proposed Findings of and Conclusions of Law "(hereinafter "Objections"). 
On July 10, 2000, counsel for Resp< .t filed a Notice to Submit regarding Petitioner's 
Objections. 
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8. During July, 2000, both c . ^d made calls to Judge Thome's clerk to inquire 
about the status of the Proposed Find and Decree and Petitioner's Objections. Judge 
Thome's clerk informed both attorne kit Judge Thome had not ruled on the Proposed 
Findings and Conclusions and the Ol ^u>ns and that Judge Thome had left the Third District 
Court to go to the Utah Court of Ap> c tK and there would be a new Judge assigned who 
would resolve the matter. 
9. Throughout August, Sepu i , and October, 2000, counsel for both parties made 
inquiries concerning the status. Coui^d tor both parties were informed by Judge Dever's 
clerk that Judge Leon A. Dever had < ui assigned to the case and he would need to review 
the matter. A copy of the transcript 1 udge Thome's ruling on April 28, 2000 was provided 
to Judge Dever to assist him in his c jsiun. 
10. On November 2, 2000, Ji v Dever made a minute entry wherein he accepted a 
portion of Petitioner's Objections an< , nied others. He also granted Respondent the 
increased lien award which Responc counsel had requested in the cover letter to Judge 
Thorne, Exhibit No. 1 hereto. Judg K \er marked corrections and deletions directly on .he 
Proposed Findings and Decree. He i e.ted Respondent's attorney to revise the Proposed 
Findings and Decree accordingly. 1 visions made by Judge Dever did not cnange the 
^__A4ollar or property award to the Part «. vcept the increase in the lien to Respondent, noted 
above. A true and correct copy of t \hnute Entry with the attached Proposed Findings and 
Decree with Judge Dever's correctio attached hereto as Exhibit No. 2. The signalure line 
for the Judge on said attached Prop* indings and Decree is unsigned. 
11. On January 16, 2001, . Oever signed the revised findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and decree of di which had been prepared by counsel for Respondent 
and approved by counsel for Petitic hese documents are referred to supra and infra as 
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the "Dever Documents", a true and v 
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ADDENDUM NO. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Gail Patricia Menz, 
Appellant and Cross-appellee, 
v. 
William Jeffrey Menz, 
Appellee and Cross-appellant. 
DEC 21 2001 
Pautette Stagg 
Clerk of tfte Court 
ORDER 
Case NO. 2D010567-CA 
This matter is before the court on a stipulated motion to 
temporarily remand the case to the district court to correct or 
modify the record pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Jointly/ the parties raise several 
questions regarding differences in the district court record that 
must "be submitted to and settled by that court." Id. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that' the motion for temporary remand is 
granted. Upon the trial court's disposition of this matter, the 
clerk shall immediately transmit the supplemental record to this 
court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties are granted twenty-
one days from the entry of trial court's disposition to amend 
their respective docketing statements on appeal. 
DATED this^ gfcifC day of December, 2001. 
FOR THE COURT: 
£&nela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
ADDENDUM NO. 3 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE DIVISION 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL PATRICIA MENZ, 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Petitioner, : 
vs. 
Case No. 984908014 
WILLIAM JEFFREY MENZ, 
: Judge: L.A. Dever 
Respondent. 
Pursuant to the request of the parties, a conference was held between Judge Wm Thome and 
Judge L.A. Dever concerning the conflict between the two decrees issued in this case. 
Judge Thome's position is that the Decree dated June 30, 2000, was signed under the 
assumption that there were no objections to the proposed decree. The original decree is not part of the 
file. The Court has a photocopy of the decree signed by Judge Thome. The record establishes that an 
objection had been made to the proposed findings and decree. 
A hearing was conducted on the objections to the proposed decree. At the time of the hearing, 
no one presented evidence that a decree had been signed on June 30, 2000. On November 2, 2000, 
Judge Dever signed a minute entry and directed the respondent's attorney to prepare findings of fact 
and decree of divorce incorporating the changes made as a result of the hearing on the objections. 
It appears from the file that the parties submitted to the Court a decree of divorce and findings 
on or about December 19, 2000. This decree was prepared by Mr. Wall and approved by Ms. West. 
The only logical deduction that can be made is that the parties did not believe that findings and a decree 
had be made before Judge Thome left the bench and therefore submitted the documents. 
Since the decree of December 19, 2000, was approved by the parties and signed by Judge 
Dever, it is the Decree of Divorce in this case. The Findings of Fact and Decree entered in error on June 
30, 2000, are set aside. 
It should be noted, however, that the Decree approved by the parties on December 19, 2000, 
and signed by Judge Dever on January 16, 2001, is incomplete, having error between page 3 and 4. 
Dated this V day of ^ fcfil, 2002 l Q flmf ( 
BY THE COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
5 I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry was mailed on the day of-Aorit 2002, to the following: 
Gregory B. Wall 
5200 South Highland Drive, Ste 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Suzanne West 
207 Neyman Street 
Salmon, Idaho 83467 
i 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE DIVISION 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL PATRICIA MENZ, 
Petitioner, 
vs 
WILLIAM JEFFREY MENZ, 
Respondent. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No 984908014 
Judge. L.A. Dever 
The Court has reviewed the memoranda of the parties objecting and responding to the 
Proposed Findings and Decree in the above named case. The Court has accepted a portion of 
the Petitioner's requests for change. Attached to this Minute Entry is a copy of the Proposed 
Findings and Decree The Court has made corrections and deletions on the copy which are to 
be incorporated by Respondent's attorney 
In reviewing the division of property, it is the Court's position that Judge Thorne clearly 
expressed his intention to divide the marital estate equally From the reading of the transcript, it 
is obvious that one item of properly that was determined to be in the estate, the petitioner's 
auto was omitted from the calculations. Judge Thorne equalized the estate by granting the 
respondent a hen on the home awarded to the petitioner The hen should be in the amount of 
$66 150 00 and not the $48,150 00 stated in the transcript A hen in the amount of $66,150 00 
would equalize the estate as intended by Judge Thorne 
Dated this 2nd day of November, 2000 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry was mailed on 
the J^> day of November, 2000, to the following: 
Gregory B. Wall 
5200 South Highland Drive, Ste 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Suzanne West 
207 Neyman Street 
Salmon, Idaho 83467 
GREGORY B. WALL (3365) 
WALL & WALL 
Attorneys for Respondent 
52C0 S. Highland Dr., Ste 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 117 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
STATE OF UTAH 
iGAIL PATRICIA MENZ, 
Petitioner 
[WILLIAM JEFFREY MENZ, 
!l 
Respondent: 
) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil NO. 984908014 
Judge William A. Thorne 
Comm. Thomas Arnett 
n w M * * A ' i A W 
) ! HC .Ml AND DKlVf 
:f (ITr i / tA i t 64 1 i," 
IM' • V * i rw. 
The above captioned matter came on for trial before the court 
bitting without a jury en February 22 and February 23, 2000, the 
Honorable William A. Thorne, district judge, presiding. The 
petitioner is Gail Patricia Menz and she was represented by her 
j 
attorney Suzanne West. The respondent is William Jeffrey Menz and 
he was represented by his attorney Gregory B. Wall. 
j Each party was present, sworn and testified as to the issues 
in this matter. Other witnesses were also called, sworn and 
testified on behalf of the various parties. Various exhibits were 
also offered by each party and received into evidence by the court. 
Closing arguments were held on April 28, 2000. Each of the 
parties was personally present and represented by their respective 
counsel. Based upon che foregoing, and the court being fully 
advised in the premises and the law, does herewith make and enter 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were married to each other on November 26, 
196", in Phoenix, Arizona, and ever since said date have been and 
are now husband and wife. Each party was a resident of Sale Lake 
County, State of Utah, at the time this action was commenced, and 
had been for at least three months immediately prior to the 
commencement of this action 
2. There have been three children born as issue of this 
marriage, however, all three are over 18 years of age, are married 
and fully emancipated. There are no minor children and no other 
children are expected ae issue of this marriage. 
3. Irreconcilable differences have arisen between the parties 
making the continuation of the marriage impossible. In confronting 
their differences it appears that the parties have attempted to 
reach some resolution of their differences, but without success. 
4. The petitioner nas also alleged mental cruelty as a ground 
for her divorce. It appears from the evidence that there have been 
repeated disputes between the parties over finances during the 
months preceding the filing of this action. There have been claims 
on both sides of lack of interest and involvement by the other 
party in the marriage, end mutual claims of a lack of affection and 
failure to assist and support the other party with their duties and 
responsibilities in the marriage. 
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e petitioner has also alleged that the respondent was 
unfaithful to hw: during the marriage, that he committed adultery 
prior to the commencerft^ t of the divorce action, and that this was 
a reason for the divorce Hbw^ver, there is no compelling evidence 
to show that the respondent was uhCaithful to the petitioner prior 
no the commencement of this action, although he has admitted having 
a relationship with another woman oniy^^fter this action was 
commenced and the parties separated. 
6. The petitioner has also claimed that there has been some 
Bhoving and argulHSrrfcaj^ o1"1 on the part of the respondent. Respondent 
has testified that petitione^ha^failed to take care of herself, 
has gained a substantial amount of weight>-hgis failed to assist and 
pupport him in the maintenance of the home and otheTr*<amily duties, 
pnd that she has been prodigal in her use of the family m^o^es. 
7. There appears aiuuuda fui mental Ciuclty by both. 
'frtarMeg and sufficient grounds for a divorce are present to award 
la divorce to the petitioner on the grounds Of meotal cruclafti^ 
,j 8. The parties separated in December, 1998, right after 
iChristmas, and have not oohabitated with one another since that 
jtime. 
9. During the course of the marriage the parties have acquired 
real property situated m Salt Lake County, State of Utah, at 4532 
Crest Oak Circle, which property has been used as the primary 
family residence. That property is more particularly described as 
fellows: 
All of Lot 903 N:. Olympus Hills No. 9 Subdivision, 
according to the official plat thereof as recorded 
V * » A I ; I A PC , 
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in the office cf the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
Parcel No. 27 - CI - 308-026 
Trie petitioner still occupies the residence and has done so since 
the separation of the parties. It is the express desire c£ 
petitioner Gail Menz :c retain possession and use of the family 
residence. 
1C. The fair market value of the residence is 5375,000.0c 
There is a mortgage balance of approximately $62,000.00. The court: 
finds that there is equity in the residence in the amount of 
•5313,000.00 . 
•i 
1
 11. For the past number of years the parties have maintained 
a joint investment account with Fidelity Investments. This account 
as tied in with the stock market and therefore the value of the 
account can fluctuate depending upon the activity of the stock 
market. 
12. in August, 1995 Mr. Menz received an inheritance of 
.$82,300.00 which he invested into the joint Fidelity Investments 
.'account. 
i 
1 3 . Approximate ly cwo years ago in 1997 Mrs. Menz r e c e i v e d an 
' i n h e r i t a n c e of $176,<cc 00 and inves ted $140 ,000 .00 i n t o the same 
i 
.joint Fidelity Inves n\enc s account, 
14. Very shortly oeiore the parties separated in late 1998, 
Mrs. Menz made a number of withdrawals from the joint Fidelity 
account that resultec n a net total to her of $261,000.00, leaving 
$lfil!000. &4 in the a ecu—. *Phc court findc that the parties frave 
made diffQrcr»^-wgir^:-T::vrT^^ tonlt.^- >,*h 1 P n .^rrrr^^r^. 
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ff^r" «rorrr ^ n d ^ n v p ^ - ^- 8om§, £he—court—finds—e4*e—fttct—t&a* 
H r M c n r c account has -: noaaQd in ^aluo oinee l a t e 1908 chould not-
A.,rr-\r -^. v ; ^ dPtr-irr.r :__ : i nCf? Mrs^—Menz—SOOk.—^—upon—herse l f 
u n i l a t e r a l l y and wit ctrt—'Jie kiiuwledge or consent of Mr—Men? ro 
•mako—t&e—above—des<.v-1^3 i—withdrawals—£~em—fche—account,—which 
exceeded hor ono-hal f- -sum e . The court t h e r e f o r e f inds thac using 
the above va lues , whi-n r e f l e c t the amounts and values at the time 
1 
Mrs. Menz made her withdrawals, is a fair and equitable point in 
,time to value the account and the amounts taken. 
• IS. The court fi: ds that due to the joint uses, commingling of 
the inheritance meme o: the parties, and the length of time which 
jthe inheritance mon- -s were commingled in the joint Fidelity 
account, the separac investments of inherited funds have lost 
their separate and * r.ie; endent character and identity and are 
therefore jointly own i funds* ^ nri hw* h«f»r. rrpfffri ni mi^ h-fry rhp7 
par~biae 
withdrawal a from the 
16. Mrs. Menz h 
has used as her separ 
$18,000 . 00, based up: 
testimony of Mrs Me 
17 Mr. Menz has 
true with a value of 
inn 11 iirgnn milting nmlirnril 
ce-3 i.nt. 
?: automobile in her possess ion which she 
- vehic le , a 1998 GMC Jimmy, with equity of 
re f a i r market value of the vehic le and the 
^ lased since the s epa ra t i on a 1999 pickup 
00.00. This i s the equi ty amount since 
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it appears that the ver. 
18. Mrs. Menz had 
her employment as a scf 
These accounts had a--vr--i 
^hc time thry aotlcr;^^; 
-gcmmencQmenc of chi-a—ae 
Llig'j'J IIIIU..IIJU Euii—p^^f. 
retirement has a curre 
the court is using tor 
19. The parties «" 
Itoarket value and equic 
20. The court ha 
extent, generally ^nd 
^he household contents 
those contents, eepara-. 
parties, is $20,CC0.0 
statement of value c: 
21. Mr. Menz nar. 
employers, Boart Long 
$137,200.00. This i 
monthly income t3r 
withholding to h:n ee 
withdraw additional fi. 
income from the ?.ccc: 
22. Mr. Menz h\: 
23 . Mrs. Men:' \>\ 
le .as been paid for in full. 
::(k and 454 retirement accounts through 
c^  ^acher with Granite School District. 
:•-. FxeefelC of $60,000.00 at approximately-, 
. -^  -.red. flt-jwi'^ y. "'"^ rh* -iwc -f rha 
:;r,- fc has spent a considerable Amount of 
,4--^=5WIT- wul» the court finds that her 
/i.ie of $20,000.00, which is the value 
; computation of the division of assets. 
io own an old house trailer with a fair 
of $1,500.00. 
received evidence as to the nature and 
tr some specifics, as to various items of 
The court finds that the fair value of 
CMIC apart from the personal effects of the 
T:,e court finds that the petitioner's 
.: 00 understates the value. 
retirement account with one of his former 
-.- -rmpany. The value of the account is 
: xed account which generates a gross 
;.;:i2 of $1,632,00, and a net after 
rr-c .-th of $1,232.00. He is not able to 
" from the account, but has a fixed monthly 
- account with a value of $317,000.00. 
.A account with a value of $100,000.00. 
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24. The valL- :f 
Fidelity Invests : -
25. Since t .< 
account has been ^ e : 
have lost their $ c r 
$145,000 .00 with 
Mrs. Menz, and t ^  
Remaining $116,0C .0 
J 26 . Adding t.v is 
•i 
total assets of ~:,.>3 
?4>y each uf Lllfc pal t1"r 
•contributed to tn re T 
point fiiujms at : rr — 
nd that ths ii: x 
be—taken—into—e-c *.-e it 
mailLai estate. 
2 8. The cou ' h 
each party of th> i,_ 
should be awardec p o 
29. During e r 
daughters of the r . • 
Wild Clover Lane : ;> 
funds were used v* \ 
payment on the * , \c 
time and labor i: 
: ^ regoing assets, except for the joint 
is $954,700.00 
• mds that the Fidelity Investments 
• and that the inheritance investments 
*-:tity, the court finds a value of the 
Menz, plus $116,000.00 withdrawn by 
at the date set by the court of the 
total of $377,000.00. 
3 prior asset subtotal the court finds 
5- -di Lhe nature of the wrongs rnmmir.iLSd 
-v j3g the other in the mariijyu thai luwe 
rrt ^r aic mutual;—and LhaL each party-gan 
er r: oxdez LO lay blaww. The—crotrrt—does 
£-£ uG of blame arc cuch that fault should 
~ —in diotributing—the—assets of—she 
:i finds that a division of one-half to 
tc : is appropriate, and that each party 
'_> . th a value of $665,850.00. 
a home was purchased for one of the 
zh property shall be designated as the 
ituated in Salt Lake County. Joint 
r,i il consent of the parties for the down 
iughter and her husband had invested 
ruction of the home and the money was 
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used co purchase the home so that the equity derived from their 
labors would not be lost Due to the fact that the daughter and 
her husband could not qualify for a loan, the heme was purchased in 
the name or Mr. Mem. The daughter and her husband have since paid 
the monthly payments, except for an arrearage to date of 
approximately $1,700.00 which Mr. Menz has had to pay, and they 
have maintained the home as their own. 
30. The court finds that the home was purchased by mutual 
agreement and consent of the parties for the benefit of the one 
•daughter and her husband with no intent that the home be the 
separate property of either of the parties. The title to the 
property is being held in what amounts to a constructive trust for 
the benefit of the daughter and husband who occupy the home. 
Therefore, the value of that home will not be included as an asset 
of the marital estate. 
31. The major assets of the parties are listed below, and the 
values attached thereto the court finds are fair and reasonable 
values. To divide the marital estate in order to award values as 
set forth in paragraph 28 above, it is fair, just and reasonable 
that the petitioner, Gail Menz, should be awarded the following 
assets 
a. The household contents: $20,000.00 
b. Mrs. Menz's IRA account: $100,000.00 
c. Mrs. Menz's retirement: $20,000.00 
d The withdrawals by Mrs. 
Menz from the joint Fidelity 
8 
account of $116,000 and 
$145,000: $261,000.00 
e. The family residence at 4532 
Crest Oak Circle, with an 
equity value of $313,000.00, 
less an equitable lien due 
Mr. Menz of tt6 -±5$ -&£: 
Value- $246,850.00 
r. GMC vehicle: $18,000,00 
TOTAL TO MRS. MENZ: $665,850.00 
32. Mr. Menz is entitled to the remaining property listed by 
'the court above as follows: 
a. Equitable lien in home: $*G, 150.00 
b. Mr. Menz's pickup truck: $28,000.00 
c. The old house trailer: $1,500.00 
d. Mr. Menz's Longyear 
retirement: $137,200.00 
e. Mr. Menz'6 IRA account: $317,000.00 
f. Balance left in joint 
Fidelity Investments acct: $116,000.00 
TOTAL TO MR. MENZ: . $665,850.00 
33. With regard to the equitable lien, that amount of 
-rsfc: srs^ £JO should be paid by Gail Menz to William Menz within five 
(5) years from the date of the Decree of Divorce, either by 
refinancing the property, selling the property, or by Mrs. Menz 
drawing upon other assets to pay the amount due. 
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34. Each party should be awarded their personal effects, their 
separate banking accounts, and any other items of personal property 
presently in their respective possessions, ail free and clear of 
any claim by the other party. 
35. Mr. Menz should immediately convey by quit claim deed the 
wild Clover Lane property to his daughter and her husband who 
occupy the home. 
For some months prior to the time the parties separated ac 
the end olsi998, Mrs. Menz, without the knowledge or consent of Mr. 
Menz incurredSubstantial credit card debts, and at the time of 
separation those d^ lsits totalled approximately $46,000.00. 
37. r^he items purchased, and which constitute the entire 
aforesaid amount, were all for married, adult daughters. Many of 
the^items are extravagant and lavish, 
i^K Mrs. Men2 has paid down the above balance since the 
parties sep^ated, but has not disclosed the balance. It is fair, 
just and reasoi^ble that each party should pay one-half of the 
1 
present, remaining balance due for the items purchased by credit 
jcard which constitute th^ above balance. The debts should be 
divided and the amounts due £*iould be paid directly to the credit 
'card companies and not by one p^txy paying money to the other. 
while many of the purchases were of a*v excessive and extravagant 
nature on the part of Mrs. Menz, an awarcKto require Mr. Menz to 
pay half of those debts is taken into consideration by this court 
in dividing the other property and debts in this c^se 
At the time the parties separated there was a second 
10 
morbgage on the home which was apparently used for various family 
purposes .\ The court finds that Mrs. Menz added to the debc after 
the separation and then paid for the debt using ]cinc monies 
*"<r&>-J3rs. Menz having used joint funds to pay for the home 
equity debt, th€ obligation should be deemed to have been paid by 
both parties and no^particular credit should be awarded to either 
party. 
41. Gail Mentis 60 years of age, teaches school full time for 
Granite School District, Imd^currently earns $43,000.00 per year, 
plus she receives various insurance^md^retirement benefits through 
that employment. 
42 7T?Frr--Meiizis contemplating hip surgery during the summer 
of 2000 on both hips simuTE^meQUSly. At the present time it is 
icult for her to continue workingwi<4iOUt the surgery. 
43. TheTi^48 some reasonable likelihood that she will be able 
to return to work aft>x^her surgery, although how much time she can 
:e to her employment is^nqt known. 
44. WilTriam Menz is 57 years ot^age, and was employed by Boart 
Longyear Company for^m^ny years selling mining equipment. In his 
last years with the company^i^ earned approximately $4,100.00 per 
month gross income. 
n^ about 1996 or 1997 Mr. Menz encountered problems with 
Boart Longyear ^rsqcerning the future of his position due to a 
decline in the mining industry worldwide, and a resulting decrease 
the need for mining equipmfei^ . and supplies. His sales had 
dropped off and he inquired about rehiring from the company. He 
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was offered alternative employment in the warehouse at an hourly 
rat- between $7.00 and">a^po per hour. Ke declined this offer and 
took an early retirement from Boa^t Longyear and began collecting 
his retirement as well as 13 months ofs^pAration pay that was part 
cf the early^B^iremenc package offered to Mr. 
46. Shortly the^^fter he went to work for another company, 
the Hoffman Company, that markets mining equipment and supplies, 
and worked for them Cor about on^rear at a salary comparable to 
that of Bcart Longyear. However, aftels^the year period the same 
market conditions affecting the mining indusfc*^caused the Hoffman 
>any to lay off Mr. Menz. 
47>Mr. Menz has some slight hearing impairment, he has high 
•blood pressurer^ncj is in his late 50's. He testified that he had 
|tnade some efforts to fina^employment in his same line of employment 
&nd experience but was unabl^to do so, that his age seemed a 
factor limiting his employment opjx^rtunities, and he therefore 
ceased looking for such employment. 
.The court finds that it would not be fair or equitable to 
require Mr. Meits^ to look for minimum wage or low paying employment 
under the circumstanc&s^cited above, particularly when his Boart 
Longyear retirement income f&vii monthly gross of $1,632.00. 
49. Under these circumstances the court does not find chat Mr. 
lenz^  is intentionally underemployed. 
50. GaUr^JJenz testified that she has monthly expenses of 
$4,231.00. Part of the^-^xPenses ar^ d u G to the fact that she has 
a married daughter and her fanul^^iving with her at petitioner's 
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acquiescence. That daughter has at times in the past paid monies 
towards t*i^  household expenses, and assists with tasks around the 
home. Mrs. Me^ v? also testified that she enjoys giving gifts and 
entertaining her family at her home, which adds to her monthly 
costs, in addition, the^id expense total includes $1,000.00 per 
month towards the aforementioned credit card debt which will now 
be halved due to Mr, Menz being required to pay one-half of that 
debt . 
^ ^Mr. Menr has monthly expenses of $2,875.00. That amount 
may increase "due to the requirement that he pay one-half of the 
credit card debt, T4*\ Menz is also assisting with back payments 
for the daughter living rn^the Wild Clover Lane property, although 
he expects her to repay him. X^she defaults he may be responsible 
for the balance due on the loan. 
52 . Both^p^rties reap income from their investment accounts 
that at times appear^to be considerable. 
I 53. in 1998, the year the parties separated, each of them 
.filed separatelriQome tax returns. Gail Menz had a gross adjusted 
•income for that year CHL $69, 745 . 00 . William Menz had a gross 
'adjusted income of $54,024.0fr> 
54. The court finds that each of the parties has received what 
essentially amounts to one-half of the primary assets of the 
parries, and each thus has a substantial measure of assets. Both 
have limited abilities to work that are roughly equivalent, and 
each receives earnings from their investment accounts and 
retirement funds. 
13 
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55. Because of the factors set forth above the court does not 
find that alimony should be awarded to either party, each being 
able to support themselves at a comparable standard of living. 
Neither party has the ability to support the other beyond their own 
capabilities . 
56. The court also does not find that the nature of fault 
causing the failure of the marriage is such that the grounds for 
Jthe divorce should be taken into consideration in awarding alimony, 
it appearing to the court that both parties are to blame to some 
degree for the failure of the marriage. 
57. The only testimony during trial regarding attorney's fees 
was the mention by Mrs. Menz of an amount in the neighborhood of 
$30,000.00. There was no other evidence presented prior to the 
time the parties rested their cases. 
58. Also due to the nature and extent of financial resources, 
the division of debts, and the described relatively equal abilities 
of the parties to meet their respective obligations, the court 
tinds that each party should pay their own costs and attorney's 
•fees incurred in this action. 
59. Commissioner Thomas Arnett made a recommendation during 
the early stages of the proceedings in this case that allowed Mrs. 
Menz to take from the joint Fidelity account up to $1000.00 per 
month to meet her needs. This was not a flat amount she was granted 
by the Commissioner'8 own clarification minute entry. During that 
time Mr. Menz paid Mrs. Menz $500.00 per month towards the amount 
she claimed she needed. Due to this fact, and the division of the 
14 
debts and assets above described, Mrs. Menz is not entitled cc any 
claim against Mr. Menz for an arrearage amount. 
60. A temporary restraining order was entered freezing certain 
accounts of Mr. Menz. That order was released as to his Bear: 
Longyear retirement account, but substituted another account. That 
restraining order should be vacated immediately in its entirety and 
any monies being held as back payments from Mr. Menz's Boart 
Longyear monthly pension account should be paid to him forthwith. 
61. Any other debts incurred by the parties should be paid by 
the party that incurred the debt, and each should hold the other 
harmless from any such debts and obligations. 
62. Each should be required to pay any obligations connected 
with any property awarded to them under the terms of the Decree of 
Divorce, including, but not limited, to the requirement that Gail 
Menz pay the monthly payments on the family residence to be awarded 
to her. 
63. Each party should hold the other harmless from the debts 
each is required to pay. Each should notify their respective 
creditors of their obligations for debts under the terms of the 
Decree of Divorce to be entered by this court. 
FROM THE FOREGOING, the court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The petitioner shall be granted a Decree of Divorce 
dissolving the marriage of the parties, the same to become absolute 
and final upon entry. 
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2. The relief more fully described above is a fair, just and 
reasonable division, and the parties shall therefore be awarded the 
relief as described in the Findings of Pact hereinabove in the 
Decree of Divorce to be entered by this court. 
3. The temporary restraining order shall be vacated 
immediately and any funds due Mr. Menz from his Boart Longyear 
retirement that were withheld previously shall be paid at once to 
him. 
DATED this day of Jtas£, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Judge 
Approved as to Form; 
SUZANNE WEST 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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GREGORY B. WALL (3365) 
WALL & WALL 
Attorneys for Respondent 
5200 S. Highland Dr., Suite 300 
Sale Lake City, Utah 84117 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
WAJL f. WAU . A T I I 
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GAIL PATRICIA MENZ, 
Petitioner 
v. 
.WILLIAM JEFFREY MENZ, 
Respondent 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
) 
) Civil No. 984906014 
) Judge William A. Thome 
« 
) Comm. Thomas N. Arnett -
The above captioned matter came on for trial before the court 
Bitting without a jury on February 22 and February 23, 2000, the 
Honorable William A. Thorne, district judge, presiding. The 
jpetitioner is Gail Patricia Menz, who was present and represented 
.by her attorney, Suzanne West. The respondent is William Jeffrey 
Menz, who was present and represented by his attorney, Gregory B. 
wall 
Each party was sworn and testified as to the issues in this 
case. Other witnesses were also called, sworn and testified on 
behalf of the parties. Various exhibits were also offered by each 
party and received by the court into evidence. The court has 
jurisdiction over the issues and the parties in this proceeding. 
Venue is proper in this county. 
Closing arguments were held on April 28, 2000 Each of the 
parties was personally present and represented by their respective 
attorneys. Based upon the foregoing, the court being fully advised 
m the premises and the law, and the court having heretofore made 
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court 
does herewith ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE AS FOLLOWS 
1. The petitioner is granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving 
the marriage of the parties, the same co become absolute and final 
upon entry. 
2. The petitioner is awarded all right, title, interest and 
estate the parties may have in the real property situated at 4532 
Crest Oak Circle, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which property 
'is more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 903, Mt. Olympus Hills No. 9 Subdivision 
according to the official plat thereof as recorded 
in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
Parcel No. 22-01-308-025 
3. The petitioner is granted the sole and exclusive right to 
the use and occupancy of the said real property. She is ordered to 
pay the monthly mortgage payments and other taxes and fees 
connected with the property as they accrue and to hold the 
respondent harmless therefrom. 
4. The above interest of the petitioner is subject to an 
equitable lien in the name of William Jeffrey Menz, the respondent, 
in the amount of $66,150.00. This amount shall be payable by 
petitioner to respondent no later than five (5) years from the date 
of the entry of this Decree of Divorce. If the property must be 
lOftNOS AT 1 AW 
*> M H . M I A N O OK'vr 
t inr 
MI c , r y tfA,< e-ii i -
* " ?4 . \t\0 
sold or refinanced to pay the lien then that shall be done 
5. Neither party is awarded any alimony. 
6. Gail Menz is awarded the 1998 GMC Jimmy automobile free and 
clear of any claim by the respondent. 
7. Gail Menz is awarded the contents of the home at 4532 Crest 
Oak Circle, free and clear of any claim by respondent 
8. Petitioner is also awarded her IRA account, her retirement 
accounts, her Fidelity Investments account, and any monies 
withdrawn previously from the joint Fidelity Investments account, 
all free and clear of any claim by the respondent. 
9. The respondent William Menz is awarded his 1999 pickup 
truck, the old house trailer, his Boart Longyear retirement 
account, his IRA account, and the balance that was left in the 
Fidelity Investments account, all free and clear of any claim by 
the petitioner. 
10. Each party is awarded the said funds and accounts 
including any changes in the nature or location of the funds from 
such accounts, as well as any increases in the accounts or funds to 
which each is entitled. Some of the monies acquired by the parties 
have been reinvested with different investment firms, or placed in 
different accounts, but they are traceable to the original assets 
awarded herein, and it is the intention of the court that those 
assets derived or traceable from the original accounts go to the 
party who is awarded the asset as set forth above. 
11. Each party is awarded their personal effects, their 
separate banking accounts, and any other items of personal property 
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presently in their respective possessions all free and clear of any 
claim by the other party. 
12. The respondent is ordered to immediately convey by quiz 
claim deed the real property known as the Wild Clover Lane property 
tc the daughter and husband who occupy that property and who claim 
the property to be theirs. Any debt payment problems connected 
with that property shall be resolved by respondent with his 
daughter and her husband, and he is ordered to hold the petitioner 
harmless therefrom. 
13. Each party shall pay one-half of the prr rVnfnfH-fmcp owrng-
-4*H; the credit card debts that were incurred by Mrs . Menz prior co 
the separation of the parties and which were 6et forth in her 
testimony and evidence to the court. The court directs that the 
accounts be divided and each pay the monies owing directly to the 
creditors* and—that—thox*—n&t—be—monies—pvrh^ng^ri be^w^en—the 
parties—Cos—s-he—payment—ef—the—s«ti£—eredxt—card—dtebt-s—unlock 
absolutely necessary-to equalize tho^accountg division. 
14. Petitioner is granted no credit or judgment against 
respondent for her payment of the second mortgage on the family 
residence. 
15. Each party is ordered to pay any debts and obligations 
incurred by them since their separation in December, 1998, as well 
as any other debts incurred by each party not specifically set 
forth herein, and to hold the other party harmless therefrom. 
16. Each party is ordered to pay their own coses and 
attorney's fees incurred in this action. 
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17. No arrearage amount is due by respondent to petitioner as 
a result of the temporary support order previously granted by this 
court. 
18. The temporary restraining order in effect is hereby 
vacated in its entirety, as to all property of the respondent 
'William J. Mens, and effective immediately. Respondent William J 
Jfienz is granted any unpaid monthly pension amounts due him from his 
i' 
IBoart Longyear pension account. 
!i 19. Each party is ordered to pay any debts connected with any 
ji 
.property awarded to them under the terms of this Decree of Divorce, 
and to hold the other party harmless therefrom. 
j, 20. Each party is ordered to notify their respective creditors 
|as to the debts each is ordered to pay under the terms of this 
ji 
jpecree of Divorce. 
21. Each party is ordered to pay their own medical and dental 
;bills that may now exist, or that may be incurred in the future, 
Jand to hold the other party harmless therefrom. 
22. The parties are mutually restrained from harming, 
threatening, bothering, stalking, harassing, or intimidating the 
other party at any time or location. 
DATED this day of Jane, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
t-fTTiTiTTiM TI T u n r m n 
District Judge 
Approved as to form: 
SUZANNE WEST 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND NOTICE OF INTENTION TO SUBMIT 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy and an 
original of the foregoing Decree of Divorce was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Suzanne West, attorney fofi.^aetitioner, 207 Neyman 
Street, Salmon, Idaho, 83467, on the / ^ v d a y of June, 2000, 
Notice is also given to the petitioner and her attorney that 
if the above Decree of Divorce is not approved as to form and 
Returned to the office of respondent's counsel by Tuesday, June 13, 
submitted to the court for the 
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